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THE LAW OF TRUSTS. By Austin Wakeman Scott. Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1939. (4 volumes). Pp. xlv, 816; xvi, 817-1727;
xvi, 1729-2604; 2605-2981. Price: $35.00.
The American Law Institute has not only produced various Restate-
ments, but it has also been the immediate intellectual support for the publi-
cation of several treatises such as Simes on Future Interests and Bogert on
Trusts. Three Harvard professors, using the authorities and the material
so collected, have now each prepared a treatise on the subject of which he
was the Reporter. Beale on Conflicts appeared first. The second and much
enlarged edition of Williston on Contracts was recently completed. Now
Professor Scott has given us a four volume treatise on Trusts. Perhaps we
may expect treatises on agency, restitution, property, and torts which,
respectively, will show a similar standard of performance.
This treatise on Trusts follows the Restatement closely. It includes,
however, the material on constructive trusts,' which subject is restated in
Restitution,2 and there is added an occasional section marked A, the subject
matter of which is new material. The matter found in "Comments" under
the various sections of the Restatement is expanded in the treatise under a
decimal system of numbering which makes possible the insertion of further
sections in case future developments should call for them.
In the introduction the author suggests that he has not dealt with all
the possible questions relating to trusts. He mentions matters which he
does not propose to discuss, among them being the use of the trust in secu-
rity transactions. Some may feel that the treatise should be more inclusive
than it is. It is hardly fair, however, to insist that the author should develop
fully the law of wills or of conveyancing, or of taxation, since this would
lead him afield and usurp the place that should be taken by other treatises.
To go much farther in citing the statutory materials would seem to involve
undue expansion and might lead the user to assume that further consulta-
tion of the statutes was not necessary. A completely exhaustive treatise
on trusts could be nothing other than an encyclopedia. The present
reviewer believes it is possible and desirable to make a dogmatic exposition
of the rules of law in special fields. The author will, of course, be char-
acterized as a conceptualist in some quarters, and though he may be, there
is nothing mechanical in his treatment of the subject.
This reviewer calls attention to a few superficial matters which he
thinks are deserving of some consideration as one uses this work. In Sec-
tion 96.7, dealing in a single paragraph with merger and consolidation of
the corporation trustee, there is no adequate discussion of the effect of the
alteration of the corporation on the right to exercise the fiduciary powers
possessed by its predecessor. There is a statement that in the absence of
statutes it is generally held that where the old trustee ceases to exist, it is
necessary to apply to the court for a new appointment. No authorities out
of the considerable number available are cited. While Massachusetts does
so hold, yet Illinois holds contra.8 The New York cases prior to the statute
of 1930 were inconclusive. There may be those who prefer the Illinois
I. §§ 461-552.
2. §§ 16o-215.
3. See Chicago Title Co. v. Zinger, 264 Ill. 31, 105 N. E. 718 (1914).
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rule, not directly affected by statute, that the successor may exercise the
power under the appointment. There are statutes, both federal and state,
conferring the right to consolidate and to merge, but, except as to the more
recent ones, they are probably insufficient to transfer fiduciary powers to
the new corporation, if a statute thereto is necessary. If the new or altered
corporation which proposes to assume fiduciary appointments is an essen-
tially different entity, then an undue delegation of fiduciary duty would
arise. If it is essentially the same corporation as the one named by will or
deed, there arises no delegation of duties. Professor Bogert devotes about
six pages to the matter.4  Presumably Professor Scott would relegate it
to a treatise on Corporations.
The author states:
"And some [courts] are beginning to recognize that as a matter
of policy the risk of loss from torts committed by the trustee in the
administration of the trust should be borne by the trust estate rather
than by the victim of the tort." 5
In Section 267 four situations are stated in which the creditor should
recover against the trustee as trustee: (a) when there is a right of exonera-
tion; (b) an unjust enrichment; (c) a contract to that effect; (d) provision
therefor in the trust instrument. A fifth situation is suggested upon which
no position was taken in the Restatement, as in the case where a liability
has arisen as a result of ownership of property and the trustee is sued.
Perhaps he would also admit here a representative suit in many cases of
equitable subrogation. I suppose Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co." would be
brought under the unjust enrichment cases. While the nature of the pro-
posed remedy in that case does not seem objectionable, the facts that the
receivers of the stolen funds were bona fide purchasers, that there was no
possibility of tracing, that it was no case for equitable subrogation, and so
no unjust enrichment seem to have been obscured by the form of the action,
which was against the substituted trustee as trustee. I should like to know
if the author thinks there may be danger in the too great extension of this
procedure and whether some caution might be suggested in this respect.
The somewhat comparable case of suits against the executor or admin-
istrator as representative might well have received some comment, even
though this is not a treatise on the administration of decedents' estates.
7
Incidentally, the powers and duties of joint executors might be accorded
some comparison with those of joint trustees. Fiduciaries are not always
technical trustees. Thus, there seems a certain degree of justification for
the plaint of Mr. Powell s respecting "beating at the barriers between
'trusts' and 'wills'."
In Section 135 I should like to have found more of a comparison and a
discussion of certain typical situations of gratuitous assignments or gratui-
tous partial assignments, e. g., of a specialty, of an intangible chose in
action, of an equitable interest in personal property, and of a legacy. Pos-
sibly it was thought this would carry too far afield. No, comment was
found upon the question arising where the donor of a general power of
appointment of trust property appoints to trustees by deed or to executors
4. 3 BOGER, TRUSTS (1935) § 531.
5. P. 1534.
6. 234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923).
7. See Re Fitzgerald's Estate, 252 Pa. 568, 97 Atl. 935 (1916). This was an action
for personal injuries for tort of the executor in the management of the business of the
testator. Recovery was allowed de bonis testatoris.
8. Powell, Book Review (r939) 39 CoL. L. Ray. 1453, 1456.
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by will, whether the new trustees or the executors shall take possession and
administer the trust under the power, or whether the prior trustees shall
continue in possessionf Likewise no discussion appears as to whether a
trustee who lends or advances to the cestui without notice of prior assign-
ment of the latter's interest is protected against the bona fide assignee.'0
Section 480.4 deals with the failure of trusts created for non-charitable cor-
porations. I was disappointed in not finding a reference to Easum v.
Bohon," which is much like the English case Cunnack v. Edwards 12 and
is a leading American decision. Section 494 seems to be superfluous.
In Section 170 it is declared that the trustee must administer the trust
solely in the interest of the beneficiary. That assumes the impossibility of
a divided loyalty. Suppose, however, that a trustee of a large percentage
of the shares of a corporation finds it advisable to become a director or
other officer of it. Is there not a possibility of a divided loyalty? 1
The author differs from the policy of the black type statement of the
Restatement occasionally, e. g., in Section 32.3 (no trustee named or is
dead or incompetent) and Section 55.1 (oral promise by devisee to hold for
a third person). Here he sets out the opposing arguments and many of the
authorities., Courts may well follow hereafter the treatise rather than the
Restatement unless they feel bound by stare decisis.14
If there were time and space, a comparison between this treatise and
the earlier excellent one by Professor Bogert would be in place. One may
at any rate say that Bogert's treatise is in some respects wider in range and
more complete. Thus, he cites some 21,ooo cases as against some 12,2oo
(both estimated) by Scott. He discusses more cases in detail and makes
a good many more citations to periodical and text literature. Scott more
or less neglects the literature that further develops some topics as, for
example, where he is "beating against the barriers between trusts" and
other subjects, such as incorporation by reference and his so-called "facts
of independent significance" and the survival of powers.
This reviewer does not think that he has ever used a technical treatise
the style of which was as pleasing as that found here. There is an unsur-
passed clarity of statement and in general a thoroughness in the handling
of difficult issues that indicate the master. This treatise as well as the
author's articles might well serve as a model for legal writing. One hazards
expressing the belief that this production compares favorably with the great
treatises of Williston and Beale.
Alvin E. Evans.t
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS. By Henry
Winthrop Ballantine and Norman Dunham Lattin. Callaghan and
Company, Chicago, 1939. Pp. xxxii, 917. Price: $6.00.
This book contains fifteen chapters and an index. It consists of 886
pages of cases and text matter printed in readable type. No attempt is
made to cover winding up and dissolution, reorganization, foreign corpora-
tions, and corporate securities other than common and preferred shares.
9. See Philbrick's Settlement, 34 L. J. (Ch. 1865).
io. See Newman v. Newman, 28 Ch. D. 674 (1885).
ii. i8o Ky. 451, 202 S. W. 901 (1918).
12. 2 Ch. 679 (i8g6).
13. See Cahn, Estate Corporations (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 136.
x4. Cf. Horsley v. Hrenchir, 146 Kan. 767, 73 P. (2d) 1010 (1937).
t Dean of the College of Law, University of Kentucky.
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Otherwise, the usual topics found in this type of casebook are dealt with
in the conventional mode.
There is here much excellent material. On the selection of cases-a
matter of judgment-this reviewer is disposed to offer no general criticism.
There is a fair sprinkling of the older decisions, where necessary to illustrate
historical development, but the more recent cases seem to predominate.
The authors frequently cite a certain comprehensive work on corpora-
tions in over a score of volumes, by volume number and page reference.
This reviewer does not believe that the maze of cases the student usually
finds if he consults the reference is nearly so helpful as would be a citation
of one or two carefully selected and authoritative cases from courts of last
resort, where the student can see the actual application of the doctrine with
a judicial exposition of principles. The average beginning student has
neither time nor inclination to explore a dozen cases when he might have
time to read one decision. A more frequent reference to such valuable
single volume texts as Ballantine (1927) and Stevens (1936) would have
been much more helpful.
The first chapter deals concisely and effectively with the distinguishing
characteristics of the partnership, the common law joint stock company, the
statutory joint stock company and the business trust.
The third chapter bears the title, The Separate Corporate Capacity or
Entity Privilege and Its Limitations, and deals with what is sometimes
referred to as the distinction between the corporation and its shareholders.
Here the authors show clearly their dislike of certain terms and phrases,
such as "corporate entity", "disregard of corporate entity", and the like.
There are full notes and many well chosen cases cited and discussed.
In approximately twelve pages the authors give the student a glimpse
into two or three of the labyrinthine passages of Blue Sky laws and the
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. There are numerous and
valuable citations to articles and cases on this intricate subject. The authors
have done as well as it seems possible to do in a volume where limitations
of space are necessarily rigid. This topic obviously cannot receive much
attention in an elementary casebook.
The vexing question concerning the power to create an executive com-
mittee of the board of directors, and then confer on it substantially all the
powers of the board, is covered by one case and a note in Chapter V, Sec-
tion 4. It seems to me that the case selected-Hayes v. Canada, etc. -
offers the student no clue to the correct solution of the problem, nor does
it intimate the real ground on which the courts divide. Better cases are
available.2 The directors in this case were obviously guilty of a breach of
fiduciary duty in absorbing control of the corporation for personal gain,
rather than of excess of authority purportedly given them and honestly
exercised in their character as members of the executive committee.
Probably the best material in the book is in Chapter IX, on Stock
Structure and Classes of Shares. It deals chiefly with preferred shares, the
topical analysis is logical and the case selection appears excellent.
The authors of the book object to and advise against the use of the
well known, and I think well understood, phrases, legal person, capacity,
intra vires, ultra vires, and corporate powers, on the ground that they are
not "realistic", or are "misleading terminology" or a "figure of speech".
There is, of course, no end to the philosophic argument on what is reality,
1. 181 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. ist, igio).
2. Hoyt v. Thompson's Ex'r, ig N. Y. 207 (1859) ; and contrasting viev in Tem-
pel v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 69, 32 S. W. 514 (1895).
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but there is little place for it in an elementary law course, where it is more
important to find the law as it is than as a philosopher thinks it should be.
Nearly, if not all, the cases in the book use the terms, and without apology.
It is a reality in the law that the business activities of corporations are lim-
ited in scope by the articles, sometimes very strictly; it is a reality in the
law that if they go beyond these limitations, their acts are open to legal
challenge in various ways and are commonly described by lawyers and
judges as ultra vires; and it is a reality in the law that in some situations
and in most jurisdictions a corporation which goes beyond what the courts
describe as its "powers" cannot be compelled to perform its engagements,
nor can a recovery in damages be had against it for their breach. In short,
this reviewer disapproves of advising against or decrying the use of words
and phrases still standard in the vocabulary of courts, practicing lawyers,
and bar examiners-the last we who teach are not permitted to forget.
Aside from the fact that little attempt is here made to suggest how the
concepts these words describe may be better labeled, the courts have no
means of expressing thoughts other than words, and, therefore, we who
teach the law cannot escape the necessity of clarifying exposition in the
class room.
"A corporation itself has no powers and cannot act except by agents,"
say the authors in a note.8 With this statement I wonder if lawyers and
lawmakers are as yet, prepared to agree. The second clause is correct, in
so far as it means that a corporation can see, feel, hear and act only through
human agents; the first part may be true from a philosophic standpoint, but
to a beginning student it is incorrect and misleading, because a "corpora-
tion", as the courts and legislatures use the term, can "exist" without share-
holders or capital, and it may continue to "exist" without officers or agents.
The giving of "agents" to the corporation does not in the least enlarge the
legal sphere within which it may act, but merely, as a practical matter,
makes it possible for it to act. This concept, still fundamental in the law,
the authors seem to reject, notwithstanding, as Justice Holmes has pointed
out,4 the "leading purpose of such statutes is" to provide a non-conductor
through which "it is impossible to see the men behind." As I read this
book, the law student is bound to infer that these "agents" exercise original
rather than delegated or derivative powers. When the directors of X
utility, as its agents, move to take A's land by condemnation, lawyers and
judges are not yet ready to concede that they are exercising a power or
privilege conferred on them rather than X, "fiction" though X may be.
In the main, it seems to me, this casebook is an important contribution
to the tools of the law teacher, as was to be expected from able and distin-
guished scholars like Professors Ballantine and Lattin. It has many admi-
rably executed notes and is indubitably a scholarly volume.
Sveinbjorn Johnson.t
PAROLE WITH HONOR. By Wilbur La Roe, Jr. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1939. Pp. x, 295. Price: $3.00.
The value of this book lies in the fact that it records the experience
and thinking of its author, a distinguished lawyer, as chairman of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Parole Board. It, therefore, gives its readers the sense
3. P. 199.
4. Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 2o8 U. S. 267, 273 (i9o8).
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
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of first-hand contact with the prisoner as a human being and with the prob-
lems of parole as Mr. La Roe met them in his day-by-day work.
This book combines fascinating reading with a clear and sound exposi-
tion of the fundamental philosophy of parole. Adequate treatment is given
to the essentials of parole, namely, its function in protecting society, its
superiority over other forms of release from prison, the necessity for ade-
quate parole machinery, improvement of parole supervision, the develop-
ment of the social resources of the community in relation to supervision of
paroled men, the recognition of the dependence of parole upon the preced-
ing stages of the treatment of the criminal by the police, by the court, and
in prison.
Mr. La Roe makes effective use of the data presented in the papers
and recommendations of the National Parole Conference held in Washing-
ton, D. C., in April, 1939. Particularly valuable is his digest from the
Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures of the operation of parole
machinery of the several states. The chief deficiencies of the book are the
omission of the development of scientific methods of the study of the inmate
as a basis for classification and parole, lack of reference to the Illinois Prison
Survey with its recommendation for the integration of parole with the other
factors of correctional treatment of the offender, and the absence of a bibli-
ography upon parole.
E. W. Burgess.t
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE INCLUDING EMPLOYERS' LIABIL-
ITY INSURANcE. By Clarence W. Hobbs. McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., New York, 1939. Pp. xviii, 707. Price: $5.00.
There appears every once in a while a book which adequately satisfies
the lay as well as the legal mind. This may well be said of the recently
issued one volume work entitled Workmen's Compensation Insurance
Including Employers' Liability Insurance. In the foreword it is stated that
the book was originally intended as a revision of a book bearing the same
title published in 1925 but written by others. This earlier work presented
both the practical operations of workmen's compensation insurance and its
economic and historical background. It is stated, however, that in the
work of revision considerable portions of the text were abandoned and
others rewritten to keep pace with the progress of the advancing times; as
a result the book under review cannot be properly termed a revision. Mr.
Hobbs has acknowledged graciously the valuable service rendered by the
authors of the earlier book, G. F. Michelbocker and Thomas M. Neal, the
general design of which is followed in the present work.
Mr. Hobb's book is a well arranged, well written, interesting, and
scholarly work. Its six hundred and thirty-four pages are divided into two
parts. The first part is devoted to a discussion of Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts. Part two treats of the matter of insurance of employers with
respect to their liability to employees under the compensation acts.
Two features of the book strike one familiar with the subject matter
discussed: one, its readableness; the other, the clarity with which decisions
upon controversial issues in connection with the Workmen's Compensation
Acts are presented. It is a book which may be as readily perused and as
easily understood by a layman as by a lawyer. It is not in our opinion
intended to be a textbook of law. No attempt is made to record the details
t Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago.
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of the numerous controversial questions arising out of conflicting court deci-
sions, all of those matters being peculiarly within the province of a law
text.
There has been no attempt upon the part of the author to cite author-
ities for each legal proposition referred to in discussing the Workmen's
Compensation Acts, although in really important instances, that is to say,
when the doctrine of a so-called leading case is adverted to, the case is
duly cited. In reviewing the causes which lead to the evolving of the
scheme of compensation embodied in Workmen's Compensation legislation,
Mr. Hobbs points out that originally in case of personal injury sustained by
one through fault of another, the rights and remedies of parties were gov-
erned by the common law rules-and the late Justice Holmes is aptly quoted
as stating that "The life of the law is not logic, but experience." The
author then traces the evolution of legal rights from the early legal con-
cepts embodied in the master and servant doctrine, with especial reference
to the defenses available and the inadequacy of this form of remedy under
conditions existing in this country at the dawn of the twentieth century, to
the origin and growth of workmen's compensation acts in this country.
The author points out that workmen's compensation laws were in force
in leading European countries a quarter of a century before the idea gained
recognition in these United States. The principal obstacle encountered in
connection with the early history of the acts seems to have been the consti-
tutional objections, but those objections were quicldy brushed aside by the
Federal Supreme Court. In connection with his discussion of the desir-
ability of a uniform federal compensation act and the propriety of such
legislation by the Federal Government, the author not inaptly says:
"As interpreted by recent decisions of the Supreme Court, and as
embodied in congressional legislation, already enacted or pending, the
authority of Congress to enact such legislation is apparently much
broader than was supposed. Congress has enacted a Social Security
Act, including provisions for old-age pensions and unemployment bene-
fits; congress has enacted legislation regulating the right of collective
bargaining, and regulating wages and hours of labor. If it can do so
much, the authority may conceivably exist to enact a comprehensive
federal compensation act. Whether one federal act obligatory upon
all throughout the country or the present system of separate state acts
is wiser is now and will remain a debatable question. There are sound
reasons in support of either view of the question. The advocate of the
principle of permitting each state to take care of its own house has
thus far prevailed."
There are two types of Workmen's Compensation Acts in force in the
United States, of which one is elective in character and the other compul-
sory. Mr. Hobbs discusses in his work with commendable clarity, inter
alia, the relation of employers and employees under the Acts; the class of
injuries covered by the Acts; what does and what does not comprise a
compensable injury; what injuries are considered as arising out of and
in the course of the employment so as to permit compensation, and other
subjects within the compensation theory as applied to injured employees.
Again, in dealing with cases not within the purview of the Act, such
as injuries sustained in interstate commerce and in maritime employment,
the author shows thorough familiarity with his subject and separates the
wheat from the chaff with fine discrimination. Another branch of the
subject-an abstruse as well as an important one-is that of extra-
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territorial enforcement of compensation claims, and the doctrine of the
cases governing this subject is clearly and understandingly presented by the
author. The work is a worthy addition to the book-shelf of any one inter-
ested in the subject of workmen's compensation.
Part two treats of the organization of insurance carriers with especial
reference to functional and business aspects. In this connection the policy
contract, re-insurance, the annual statement, rate regulation, rate making,
application of rates and kindred subjects are separately treated and very
fully discussed. In the course of his observation in respect of this branch
of the matter Mr. Hobbs very pertinently observes that an insurance com-
pany has a very important functional part in the economic and social fabric
of the states; and that "there appears a steady movement in the direction
of a closer organization of society; that the underwriter finds himself in a
world where what he does is more and more a matter of public concern and
that it is necessary for the various underwriting units to take note of this
tendency and to take proper measures accurately to determine and faith-
fully to perform whatever they are supposed to do in the public interest."
Insurance executives may well ponder these observations if their companies
are to carry on successfully. The failure of insurance units to sense this
situation is undoubtedly the cause of the growing tendency in the direction
of intervention by the federal and state governments in this field of activity.
When the citizenry of a country feels that it is not getting the protection
to which it is entitled, there is then a demand that the government take
over and fill the void. Insurance should not be considered entirely from
the standpoint of profit, but there should be combined therewith the element
of social service. This latter feature, however, seems to be lost sight of in
some cases. For example, the unfairness from the public standpoint of the
automatic cancellation of accident and health insurance policies when an
insured most needs the protection, and other drastic cancellation reserva-
tions in contracts will inevitably result in federal form of policy as a pre-
requisite to the carrying on of interstate business. It is rather curious that
there has been a lack of prescience in this respect upon part of responsible
heads in view of the broad interpretation that is now being given to the
commerce clause of the Constitution and the almost daily reversal of the
earlier doctrines of limitation of federal powers in this respect. What is
happening in the field of compensation insurance carriage may and prob-
ably will be extended at no distant date to other spheres of insurance
activity. There will be less call for regulation when it is perceived by
responsible heads that insurance is to be considered not from the profit
standpoint solely but as a factor to be necessarily adjusted to our advancing
social life and the wants of the people.
We commend Mr. Hobbs' work to the careful examination of those
interested in the subject treated therein. The book is a well written work
of a highly informative character and will fully repay one for the time
devoted to it.
Francis I. McCanna.t
t Lecturer in Law, Boston University.
